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Abstract
Concepts deriving from criminology, housing policy, and environmental psychology are 
integrated to test two ways that housing conditions could relate to crime in a declining 
first-ring suburb of Salt Lake City. For existing housing, we use a model to test whether 
housing incivilities, such as litter and unkempt lawns, are associated with later crime. 
For new housing, we test whether a new subdivision on a former brownfield creates 
spillover reductions in nearby crime and incivilities.
Police-reported crime rates were highest for residences near the brownfield and lowest 
for those farther away. After the subdivision was constructed, this linear decline disap­
peared, reflecting less crime adjacent to the new subdivision, but also more crime far­
ther away. A multilevel analysis shows that incivilities, particularly litter and unkempt 
lawns on the block, predict unexpected increases in crime. Both brownfield redevelop­
ment and reductions in incivilities may be important ways to improve declining subur­
ban areas.
Keywords: Community development and revitalization; Crime; Urban policy
In tro d u ctio n
Both large- and small-scale physical conditions may relate to crime and 
neighborhood viability. Criminology theory emphasizes how small-scale 
incivilities, such as bad lawns and litter, may invite crime problems 
later. Housing policy focuses on how large-scale conditions, such as a 
subdivision of new single-family detached homes, may improve neigh­
borhood appearance and reduce crime. We examine both of these possi­
bilities in the context of a newly constructed subdivision that replaced 
a brownfield in a declining first-ring suburb of Salt Lake City. We test 
whether living in a residence that looks unkempt or having block
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neighbors who do so relates to future crime risk. Similarly, we examine 
whether blocks near the brownfield are at greater risk for crime and 
whether this risk diminishes when the new subdivision is built.
Despite the centrality of the problem of crime and fear of crime for 
urban residents, few articles discussing urban housing policy have 
addressed crime (for an exception, see Witte 1996). Yet fear of crime 
is “probably the biggest obstacle to attracting middle-class house­
holds back into declining cities or retaining those that are there now” 
(Downs 1997, 390). Recent advances in criminology, older concepts in 
environmental psychology, and current housing policies are converging 
in a way that might offer urban neighborhoods a two-pronged approach 
to dealing with crime and fear. Specifically, both the absence of small- 
scale incivilities on existing residential properties and blocks and the 
addition of a concentrated new investment in housing to replace a for­
mer brownfield are investigated as ways to reduce crime.
The first goal of this article is to describe how incivilities theory relates 
physical appearances to crime; we adapt this theory from its urban 
beginnings and apply it to a declining suburban residential context. 
Next, a rationale for revitalizing neighborhoods by building new mid­
dle-class housing in declining neighborhoods is articulated. The poten­
tial benefits of both housing production and a reduction in incivilities 
are tested with a longitudinal naturalistic examination of 58 residential 
blocks surrounding a brownfield that was later transformed into a sub­
division of 84 single-family detached homes.
In c iv ilit ie s  an d  crim e
In the original description of the incivilities thesis, Wilson and Kelling 
(1982) suggest that a “stable neighborhood of families who care for 
their homes” (32) can change over months or years to “an inhospitable 
jungle” (32):
A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is 
smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, embold­
ened, become more rowdy Families move out, unattached adults 
move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The mer­
chant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumu­
lates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an 
inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. 
Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers. (32)
For some theorists, minor problems such as broken windows can con­
tinue to escalate, creating a downward spiral into major consequences,
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such as social withdrawal by neighbors, crime, housing abandonment, 
and business collapse (Skogan 1990; Wilson and Kelling 1982).
Various studies and policies have addressed how problematic physical 
conditions relate to crime and/or neighborhood decline. Terms used to 
characterize these minor problems include “incivilities,” “disorder,” 
“signs of crime,” “cues to danger,” and “broken windows,” among oth­
ers (Hale 1996). “Incivilities” and “disorder” are the most commonly 
used terms. We use “incivilities,” which emphasizes how environmental 
cues can detract from normative appearances. We avoid “disorder” 
because it often suggests, prematurely, that disorderly social conditions 
among residents cause the environmental cues. Incivilities may arise 
from many different conditions, such as overuse of the environment, 
the presence of very well-ordered gangs, or a variety of resident charac­
teristics, such as old age, poor health, poverty, lack of upkeep skill, lack 
of time to maintain appearances, or lack of interest in doing so.
Researchers sometimes investigate social incivilities, such as inebriates 
or unsupervised youth congregating in public areas. Our research, how­
ever, will focus on physical incivilities, which include physical evidence 
of decay, decline, or poor upkeep. Such incivilities can be temporary and 
fairly easy to remove, such as litter, or more enduring and difficult or 
expensive to improve, such as sagging roofs. Physical incivilities are 
more amenable to community development and housing interventions 
and less episodic than the presence of particular individuals.
The most publicized use of incivilities theory is to enact policing cam­
paigns to curb minor problems, such as subway graffiti, in hopes of 
preventing major crime, fear, and decline (Kelling and Coles 1996). 
Sometimes police campaigns to reduce incivility have included contro­
versial actions, such as overeager enforcement of minor crime ordi­
nances. Our research does not deal with any of these policies, but 
concentrates instead on the effects of physical incivilities on crime. 
Although housing and community development professionals do not 
typically use the term “incivilities,” we believe that reducing them is 
central to the efforts of many housing construction, rehabilitation, 
maintenance, and neighborhood revitalization efforts and that it con­
stitutes a high priority among residents. Consequently, if physical 
incivilities relate to crime, policies to deal with them should go beyond 
policing to involve housing and zoning officials, community develop­
ment professionals, neighborhood leaders, and residents. We believe 
this to be particularly true for suburban incivilities, which may differ 
from urban incivilities in cause and effects.
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U rban in c iv ilitie s
Although the dramatic transformation to neighborhood jungles por­
trayed by Wilson and Kelling (1982) may occur, their vignette involves 
distinctly urban conditions. Most notably, the spiral of decline they 
described takes root on public land near abandoned or commercial 
properties that may not exist in more suburban areas. Research con­
firms that public spaces are associated with incivilities such as vandal­
ism and litter (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, 
and Earls 1997), as well as police service calls (Kurtz, Koons, and 
Taylor 1998).
Incivilities may be more likely and troublesome on public or commer­
cial property for a number of reasons. First, such properties are 
designed and managed to attract a wide variety of users, including 
those who may commit crimes (Cohen and Felson 1979). In addition, 
many users simply can erode a place more quickly (Kurtz, Koons, and 
Taylor 1998; Taylor et al. 1995). Although pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic can be good for businesses, it can also impede local informal 
caretakers from creating a network of mutual concern and recognition 
that may prevent crime (Appleyard and Lintell 1972; Brown and 
Altman 1981).
Second, as suggested by Wilson and Kellings’ (1982) vignette, certain 
public or commercial properties can invite trouble. Alcohol sales, which 
involve the risk factors of ready cash flow and uninhibited drinkers, 
can invite crime (Roncek and Bell 1981; Roncek and Pravatiner 1989). 
Further, schools, which draw youths of crime-prone age, are also associ­
ated with higher levels of crime (Roncek and Faggiani 1985). Finally, 
storefronts, particularly abandoned ones, are related to litter, graffiti, 
and vandalism (Kurtz, Koons, and Taylor 1998). In sum, certain types 
of nonresidential properties have been implicated in greater vulnerabil­
ity to crime (Kurtz, Koons, and Taylor 1998). Thus, converging lines of 
evidence suggest that incivilities associated with more urban and com­
mercial areas may invite crime, but few studies examine the effects of 
incivilities in more private residential contexts.
Su burban  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  p la ce  a tta ch m en t
Suburban homes, by contrast, have been studied as venues for territo­
rial personalization or upkeep, with these processes serving largely pos­
itive social and psychological functions. Consider lawn maintenance, for 
example. Our neighbors who live in the high desert struggle to make 
Kentucky bluegrass flourish. Suburban lawns are important icons
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symbolizing high neighborhood standards of upkeep as well as pride in 
place (Altman and Chemers 1980; Jackson 1985). When residents of 
poor neighborhoods can create well-tended landscapes, they also feel 
greater neighborhood safety (Kuo, Bacaicoa, and Sullivan 1998) and 
neighborhood commitment (Coley, Kuo, and Sullivan 1997), while also 
reducing crime (Kuo, Bacaicoa, and Sullivan 1998). In addition, person­
alization can signal cultural or ethnic group membership and pride of 
place (Arreola 1981; Greenbaum and Greenbaum 1981). Research 
demonstrates that residential personalization can create positive 
messages about individual and group identity and psychological and 
behavioral investment in the home and neighborhood.
Although personalization of suburban homes is a common technique 
for creating and conveying positive ties to place, few studies examine 
how incivilities in suburban areas might create or reflect more negative 
qualities. Of the 12 incivilities studies reviewed by Ross and Mirowsky 
(1999), for example, only one (Taylor and Hale 1986) included unkempt 
lawns as an important indicator. Graffiti and vandalism may exist in 
the suburbs as well as in urban areas, but unkempt lawns and homes 
in disrepair may constitute more pervasive and salient incivilities in the 
suburbs. Beyond unkempt lawns, these incivilities include peeling 
paint, sagging roofs, sidewalks in disrepair, litter, graffiti, broken win­
dows or lights, and the absence of gardens. We will track both the levels 
and effects of suburban incivilities to see whether they predict future 
crime.
It is also important to assess the social psychological processes that 
might underlie incivilities and risk of crime in residential environ­
ments. One relevant process is place attachment, the positive affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral bonding with places and people associated 
with a setting (Brown and Perkins 1992). Place attachment may relate 
directly or indirectly to risk of crime in a number of ways. Residents 
with greater attachments may be more vigilant territorial guardians of 
their own and neighboring properties. Those with strong attachments 
to home may also spend more time there (Fuhrer, Kaiser, and Hartig 
1993), becoming more effective guardians against crime. When resi­
dents alter their properties as an expression of pride and attachment, 
the alterations, such as fences or shrubs (Brown and Altman 1983; Tay­
lor, Gottfredson, and Brower 1984) or address or name markers (Brown 
and Altman 1983), have been associated with a lower risk of crime. 
Place attachment may help inspire residents to mobilize against com­
munity crime problems, such as abandonment of property by landlords 
(Saegert 1989). Personalization and upkeep of home and yard can cre­
ate occasions for neighborhood interaction and elicit or reinforce bonds
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of neighborly cohesion or watchfulness (Brown 1987; Brown and 
Werner 1985; Werner, Peterson-Lewis, and Brown 1989).
Both resident activity and environmental upkeep send messages to 
potential offenders that the residence is well guarded and cared for. 
Indeed burglars can infer, just by looking at a house, whether residents 
have neighbors who would react to the burglar’s presence; if so, the 
house is judged to be a poor target (Brown and Bentley 1993). Simi­
larly, lay observers can detect, by looking at photographs of homes, 
which residents have strong place attachments to their home or block 
(Harris and Brown 1996). Finally, place attachment and observed inci­
vilities were associated with lower risk of subsequent crime in the tar­
get neighborhood five years ago (Brown, Perkins, and Brown 2004); 
this merits a follow-up longitudinal investigation.
M easu rem en t o f  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  crim e-re la ted  consequences
Unlike most other studies of incivilities, this one focuses on how levels 
of physical incivilities noted by trained observers can predict subse­
quent official crime reports to the police. These measures are chosen 
because they are conceptually central to an incivilities theory, method­
ologically sound, and of great interest to community development and 
housing officials. All theories assume that troublesome incivilities start 
with their actual presence in the environment, yet most empirical stud­
ies focus on “perceived incivilities,” that is, resident reports. In many 
studies, residents who report more incivilities in their neighborhoods 
also report more fear of crime (see the studies cited by Hale 1996, 
Perkins and Taylor 1996, and Taylor 1999b). In a few studies, residents 
who report more incivilities in their neighborhoods also report more 
crime victimization (Borooah and Carcach 1997; Rountree, Land, and 
Miethe 1994; Skogan 1990, for robbery).
R esidents’ perceptions. Although residents’ perceptions were initially 
believed to be valid indicators of incivilities in the environment (Skogan 
1990), subsequent research has shown that this is not always true. 
Especially at the individual level, resident perceptions of incivilities are 
only modestly related to ratings of neighborhood conditions by trained 
observers (McGuire 1997; Perkins et al. 1993). Nevertheless, perceived 
and observed incivilities independently predict fear of crime (Box, Hale, 
and Andrews 1988; Covington and Taylor 1991), so both measures 
could be distinct but useful indicators of crime-related problems. Taylor 
and colleagues believe that residents with heightened environmental 
reactivity or proneness to complain might express those qualities by
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perceiving more incivilities and reporting more crime problems than 
their neighbors (Covington and Taylor 1991; Taylor 1997a, 1999b).
Also, the common practice of asking about incivilities and crime in the 
same interview does not allow researchers to determine whether per­
ceived incivilities precede crime. In our research, we overcome both 
weaknesses: We assess observed incivilities by using trained raters, and 
we rely on police reports of crimes occurring after interviews with resi­
dents. Of the two forms of police reports—initial calls for service and 
final reports—we chose the latter, which indicate that the police agree 
that there is evidence of a crime. They therefore represent a measure 
with some convergence across resident and police assessments of crime.
Observed incivilities and police reports o f crime. The few studies that 
include both observed incivilities and reports of crime deserve special 
review, given their relevance to neighborhood policies on incivilities 
and housing conditions. Across 66 Baltimore neighborhoods, observed 
neighborhood decay, nonresidential uses of land, and vacancies all cor­
related with an index of serious crime reports (Taylor, Shumaker, and 
Gottfredson 1985). Neighborhood incivilities observed on Chicago 
streets and sidewalks can predict increases in robbery and homicide, 
but not burglary (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999); observed incivilities 
in Baltimore predict increased homicides, but not robbery, assault, or 
rape (Taylor 2001). Observed litter on residential blocks relates to an 
index of quality-of-life crimes (drug dealing, harassment), but not seri­
ous crimes (Perkins et al. 1993). Graffiti and litter on public areas of 
inner-city Philadelphia blocks relate to robbery and an index of quality 
of life crimes, but not six other types of crime. Vandalism was related to 
three types of police reports (service calls, burglary, and physical incivil­
ity crimes), but not five others (Kurtz, Koons, and Taylor 1998). These 
results demonstrate some relationship between physical incivilities and 
official crime reports, particularly in large crime-prone cities and for 
crime indexes rather than single crimes. However, these results do not 
give enough attention to inner-suburban areas, which are threatened 
with decline in many areas of the country (Orfield 2002).
In sum, our study tests whether observed physical incivilities and resi­
dents’ expressed place attachments predict police-reported crime in a 
declining first-ring suburb of Salt Lake City. An earlier multilevel study 
of the same blocks indicated that block-level attachments to home 
reported by residents and block- and property-level housing incivilities 
observed by raters were both associated with crime (Brown, Perkins, 
and Brown 2004); the present study allows a longitudinal test of 
whether earlier block conditions predict later crime.
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T h e b lo ck  a n d  h om e as u n its  o f  a n a ly sis
In choosing the units of analysis for a study of incivilities, Taylor 
and colleagues (Perkins and Taylor 1996; Taylor 1988, 1997b; Taylor, 
Gottfredson, and Brower 1984) have argued that street blocks are 
important natural units for the social, environmental, and psychologi­
cal processes relevant to community development and crime preven­
tion. Compared with more distant neighbors, neighbors on the same 
block are most likely to develop commitments to the block on the basis 
of simple repeated exposure to one another, casual surveillance of peo­
ple and property, and shared norms relating to appearances and per­
mitted activities. Blocks also have different patterns of stability, design, 
land use, and traffic, which can affect resident behavior and sentiment 
(Taylor 1997b). Housing conditions on one’s own property and on sur­
rounding properties on the block, rather than more distant conditions 
in the neighborhood, might be especially important in terms of signals 
to encourage mutual upkeep (Quercia and Galster 1999). Finally, if 
blocks vary in risk of crime, then prevention efforts could be targeted 
block by block, in keeping with the capacities and philosophy of many 
local community development agencies.
We believe that criminals do not randomly pick sites on a block to vic­
timize, but rather use physical appearances to select properties that 
look least protected by residents or their neighbors (Brown and Altman 
1981). Consequently, we will examine how incivilities could make indi­
vidual properties more subject to crime. According to past research, 
burglars pick targets that look less personalized than neighboring 
houses (Brown and Altman 1983) and places where they believe neigh­
bors will not act as guardians of the property (Brown and Bentley
1993). Indeed, recent research has begun to focus on crime “hot spots,” 
which can be particularly crime-prone buildings or parts of blocks (Eck 
1997). Thus, unlike other studies of incivilities in public spaces (Kurtz, 
Koons, and Taylor 1998; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999), we examine 
the effects of incivilities on private properties.
A focus on individual properties is also apt because suburban incivili­
ties are especially likely to result from resident action or inaction. In 
more urban settings, incivilities appeared as a result of outside forces, 
not internal neighborhood dynamics. For example, incivilities have 
been attributed to panhandlers or inebriates frequenting corner stores 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982) or absentee landlords neglecting their large 
rental properties (Saegert 1989). In the suburban context, we predict 
that residents with more physical incivilities on their property or less 
attachment to their homes may be more at risk of crime. Hierarchical 
linear models (HLMs) will be used to provide appropriate and separate
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tests for individual- and block-level predictors of household crime 
victimization.
C rim e an d  h o u s in g  c o n stru c tio n  on  b row n fie ld s
If small-scale incivilities predict crime, can large-scale improvements 
and removal of incivilities reduce crime? If so, current housing policies 
may provide a tool for larger neighborhood crime prevention. Current 
policies to improve urban neighborhoods are driven by the idea that 
concentration of poverty is harmful, but they offer different deconcen­
tration strategies. One option is to support poor people’s moves to 
wealthier neighborhoods. Moving to Opportunity (or Section 8 vouchers 
or scattered site public housing) are expected to help residents gain not 
only better housing, but also neighborhoods with better job opportuni­
ties, education, and other benefits (Rosenbaum 1997). However, build­
ing new housing for poor people in good neighborhoods typically invites 
objections from neighbors over such issues as traffic, housing and site 
design, and growth (Pendall 1999). Indeed, new affordable housing, if 
built in large numbers, can sometimes drag down the value of nearby 
property (Galster, Tatian, and Smith 1999). For these and other rea­
sons, cities may have limited opportunities to improve neighborhood 
quality by giving poor people the ability to profit from the better 
opportunities provided by wealthier neighborhoods.
A different approach is to attract wealthier people into poorer neigh­
borhoods by constructing good-quality housing. The HOPE VI program 
replaces severely distressed public housing developments with lower- 
density, mixed-income housing that, when designed and built in the 
right circumstances, attracts middle-income residents. HOPE VI re­
development has been criticized because it does not mandate a one- 
for-one replacement of public housing units. Consequently, a better 
strategy would be to provide new housing that produces a net increase 
in the housing supply
Reclaiming vacant or contaminated brownfields for housing can avoid 
displacing former residents. In a New Jersey study of 100 brownfields, 
for example, most were near residential areas, and their redevelopment 
into housing could provide 6 percent to 29 percent of the area’s five- 
year housing demand (Greenberg et al. 2001). The United States has 
over 500,000 brownfields, many of which could be remediated for hous­
ing or other types of redevelopment (Haughey 2001). Under the Home- 
ownership Zone program, incentives were provided to developers 
willing to build housing on formerly vacant or blighted land, often 
brownfields with contamination from defunct industries. This program
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helped fund site preparation and construction of large housing develop­
ments, identified in the policy as 300 units or more (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 1996). Other federal, state, 
and city policies also help redevelop neglected sites through land dona­
tion, liability reduction, tax increment financing, and other mecha­
nisms (Haughey 2001; US. Environmental Protection Agency 2000). 
These strategies may elicit less neighborhood resistance than building 
in existing residential areas, given that they lead to visible improve­
ments in areas that had been abandoned or contaminated.
We examine a brownfield remediation that provided new housing with­
out displacing current residents. The target neighborhood was an older, 
declining inner suburb west of downtown Salt Lake City. Although sin­
gle-family detached homes predominated, rental conversions, poverty, 
and ethnic diversity increased between the 1980 and 1990 censuses.
The new 84-unit subdivision replaced an abandoned school with a 
crumbling parking lot, a defunct florist/nursery, and a garbage-strewn 
field. To attract a private developer, a HUD demonstration grant was 
used to take care of environmental cleanup (from pesticide contamina­
tion by the former floral property and building contaminants from the 
razed school), floodplain mitigation, and infrastructure (new roads, 
sewers, etc.). The resulting homes are identical to middle-income subdi­
visions provided by the same builder in other neighborhoods. Although 
the city hoped to attract middle-income residents, special loans were 
also available to enable at least 20 percent of the buyers to have lower 
incomes (80 percent or less of the area median income).
Those who study neighborhood revitalization hope that such visible 
neighborhood improvements inspire “incumbent upgrading,” the 
improvement of private properties by residents who do not receive 
direct benefits from revitalization (Clay 1983). The theory is that resi­
dents see improvements and believe that their new neighbors will care 
about appearances. They will also feel better about staying in the 
neighborhood and investing their own money in needed maintenance or 
property improvement. However, Varady (1986) found that scattered- 
site rehabilitation did not inspire surrounding residents to improve 
their own properties, although he speculated that more concentrated 
efforts, such as a new subdivision, might have more beneficial spillover 
results for the neighborhood. Some research does indicate that more 
concentrated efforts in the form of new housing construction can ele­
vate nearby property values (i.e., from one block to 1,000 feet away— 
Ellen et al. 2001; Lee, Culhane, and Wachter 1999; Simons, Quercia, 
and Marie 1998).
Other studies involve high-profile demonstration projects, such as the 
South Bronx or Baltimore’s Sandtown-Winchester neighborhoods,
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where over $60 million in investment and many social services were 
funneled into neighborhood revitalization in the first year of a multi­
year effort (Goetz 1997; Schorr 1997). These studies often focus on 
important outcomes such as housing production numbers or increased 
property values, but omit other important outcomes, such as spillover 
reduction of incivilities and crime.
Although the target subdivision in our study was strongly supported by 
the leaders of the community council, a larger random survey of resi­
dents (Brown and Perkins 2002) showed that few believed it would 
reduce crime and many believed it would entail some costs to the 
neighborhood. Over half (52 percent) thought it would have no effect 
on area crime rates, and fully 36 percent thought it would increase 
them. Moreover, many believed the new development would increase 
housing costs (70 percent) and property taxes (73 percent), and most 
(70 percent) thought it would increase traffic. If residents do benefit 
from spillover reductions in crime, greater awareness of this benefit 
among housing professionals could ease negotiations with suspicious 
neighborhoods.
On the basis of an extension and adaptation of an incivilities theory, 
we hypothesized that if new housing is sold successfully, it can reduce 
crime and incivilities. A new subdivision represents the reverse of what 
is typically encountered in incivilities research. Here is an infusion of a 
large-scale “civility,” new and attractive homes replacing a neighbor­
hood eyesore. The new residents may have higher incomes than other 
in-movers to the neighborhood, providing human resources to oppose 
decline. An area that had been hidden from surveillance by residents is 
now populated with resident guardians; both features have been impli­
cated in preventing crime (Brown and Altman 1981; Newman 1972).
If the new development removes an area where offenders had been free 
to gather, then this should decrease crime, especially for residents 
immediately surrounding the former vacuum in social control. In past 
research, spillover benefits from incumbent upgrading or new housing 
construction have been limited to a few blocks away. Logically, replac­
ing vacant and abandoned properties with homeowners who want to 
assert control over their neighborhood should benefit the area closest to 
the intervention, if there is any spillover at all. Thus, we will examine 
whether there is an initial linear decline in incivilities and crime as dis­
tance from the blighted brownfield increases, a decline that disappears 
when the area is replaced by the new subdivision.
Finally, few studies have examined whether incivilities continue to 
plague the same neighborhood over time. Some suggest that incivilities 
inspire clean-up campaigns so that high levels at one time can be fol­
lowed by lower levels years later (Kelling and Coles 1996). Others are
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more pessimistic, noting that incivilities can beget more incivilities 
(Skogan 1990). Alternatively, potentially ephemeral incivilities, such as 
litter, might change more over time than sagging roofs or other indica­
tors of long-term decay (Ross and Mirowsky 1999). Before creating 
housing or crime programs to deal with incivilities, it is important to 
track natural levels of them over time.
In sum, our study addresses the following questions:
1. Do the new residents elevate the socioeconomic profile of the area?
2. Given the five-year lag between two assessments of incivilities, do 
the incidences change over time in a neighborhood that had been 
experiencing decline?
3. Does crime decrease for residents near a new housing revitalization 
site?
4. Do incivilities and place attachments predict later police-reported 
crime?
5. Do incivilities at Time 1 (the first assessment) and unexpected 
changes in incivilities from Time 1 to Time 2 (the second assess­
ment) predict subsequent increases in crime? How do effects differ 
for individual- and block-level factors?
M eth od s
N eigh borh ood  context
The site is undergoing gradual decline, which makes it compelling for a 
study of incivilities and crime. Various researchers have suggested or 
found that incivilities are especially important for crime-related out­
comes in neighborhoods facing moderate levels of problems (Taub, Tay­
lor, and Dunham 1984; Taylor and Shumaker 1990; Taylor, Shumaker, 
and Gottfredson 1985; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The target neighbor­
hood has one of the worst reputations for, and reports of, crime in Salt 
Lake City. Census data from 1970 to 1990 indicate that household 
incomes in this area have decreased from $26,000 to $19,000 (in con­
stant 1989 dollars), despite a city average that remained stable at about 
$29,000. The census block groups have an (unweighted) average of 
29.43 percent poverty, compared with 16.4 percent citywide (Salt Lake 
City Corporation 1993); research suggests that the negative effects of 
concentrated poverty occur in areas with at least a 20 percent poverty 
level (South and Crowder 1997).
Fannie Mae Foundation
Crime, New Housing, and Incivilities in a First-Ring Suburb 313
An increase in ethnic diversity in the area involves young families, 
because school enrollment figures show that 42 percent of the student 
body consists of ethnic or racial minorities (Salt Lake City Corporation
1994), compared with about 35 percent for the population at large. 
Although single-family detached homes comprise the majority of the 
housing stock, owner occupancy decreased from 68 percent in 1980 to 
56.6 percent in 1990. In sum, the area resembles a classic neighborhood 
in transition, with more transient housing conditions and lower-income 
residents, reflecting the presence of long-term residents as well as the 
influx of younger, ethnically diverse families.
S a m p le  selection
Given the focus on detecting spillover benefits from the new subdivi­
sion, sampling was designed to choose representative blocks at varied 
distances from the site, but within the same neighborhood boundaries. 
The sample neighborhood involves nine census block groups comprising 
parts of three tracts; the block groups are contiguous and largely 
bounded by major roads or freeways. Eligible blocks were defined as 
those with between 10 and 100 residential properties (thereby exclud­
ing blocks with too few residences for data analyses and excluding 
three blocks with large rental complexes on the arterial edge). Next, 55 
sample blocks (with 1 more added to total 56 at Time 2) were randomly 
chosen with a probability proportionate to size procedure. In addition, 
to achieve a large enough sample near the brownfield, four blocks were 
oversampled at random from those located within two blocks of the 
site. These over sampled residences do not differ from surrounding ones 
on any of the variables chosen for this study, so all data are combined.1 
Individual properties were selected on chosen blocks by starting with 
the lowest address, then selecting every third residence until there 
were at least eight. Although 59 blocks were assessed at Time 1, police 
report data were missing for one of them, so 58 Time 1 blocks are 
included. The Time 2 follow-up study did not constitute a panel, given 
the change in resident populations over the years and the expansion of 
data collection at Time 2.
1 Bonferonni corrected £-tests for differences revealed that nearby oversampled resi­
dents favored less public tax money spent on neighborhood road improvements than 
others (see analysis and additional methodological details in Brown and Perkins 2002). 
These results may reflect the fact that road building for the new subdivision had begun 
midway through the interviews.
Housing Policy Debate
314 Barbara B. Brown, Douglas D. Perkins, and Graham Brown
D a ta  collection  procedu res
Environmental inventories of properties at Time 1 (1993) preceded 
Time 1 resident surveys (1994 to 1995) and Time 1 police reports of 
crime (1995 to 1996). Then at Time 2, environmental inventories were 
repeated (1998), followed by Time 2 resident surveys (1998 to 1999) 
and Time 3 crime (1999 to 2000).
Environmental inventories. The environmental assessment measured 
physical signs of decay or improvement visible on a total of 488 residen­
tial properties at Time 1 and 901 at Time 2. Environmental inventories 
were completed by trained raters before the resident surveys, with at 
least 8 properties per block assessed at Time 1 and, ideally, at least 12 
per block at Time 2. (Because of some limited block sizes and mergers, 
between 9 and 19 properties per block were actually assessed at Time
2.) Incivilities associated with homes included poor roof conditions and 
peeling paint, poor yard maintenance, and evidence of graffiti and litter 
(adapted from reliably rated inventories by Brown and Altman 1983; 
Perkins et al. 1993; and Perkins, Meeks, and Taylor 1992). Pairs of 
raters assessed a subset of the properties (365 at Time 1 and 201 at 
Time 2), with acceptably high inter-rater reliabilities ranging from 0.70 
to 0.93 at Time 1 and 0.92 to 1.00 at Time 2.
Survey administration. At Time 1 (in 1994 and 1995), at least five resi­
dents were interviewed on most blocks (one block had 3 interviews and 
three blocks had 4), for a total of 357 interviews, representing a 72.71 
percent response rate. At Time 2, at least 7 interviews were completed 
per block, yielding 617 interviews; of 930 initial contacts for interviews, 
13.65 percent refused and 16.76 percent were unresolved (no one at 
home after eight or more attempts to contact or no English or Spanish 
spoken). Also, 2 interviews were unintentional repeats and were 
dropped. Thus, 86.35 percent of English or Spanish speakers contacted 
provided interviews, and 69.59 percent of all addresses contacted 
yielded interviews. Purchased telephone lists proved inadequate, so 
telephone interviews were supplemented by at-home, in-person inter­
views. The adult who had the most recent birthday was selected for the 
interview (O’Rourke and Blair 1983). Spanish and English versions of 
the approximately 25-minute interview addressed perceptions of neigh­
borhood social fabric, crime problems, and physical conditions, and 
awareness of ongoing city revitalization plans.
M easures
Home attachment. Place attachment can be measured for many differ­
ent geographic levels, from rooms in a home to cities. However,
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residents’ home attachments, including expressions of pride in the 
home and its exterior appearance, are the most relevant aspect when 
research concerns physical incivilities on private properties. A 3-item 
composite assessed how proud residents are of their house, the way 
their front yard looks, and the way the exterior of their house looks 
(adapted from Brown and Werner 1985; coefficient alpha = 0.88 for 
Time 1 and 0.90 for Time 2).2
Home incivilities. An 8-item composite included objectively observed 
amounts of litter; graffiti; broken windows or lights; peeling paint; 
roofs, lawns, and sidewalks in poor condition; and the absence of a 
flower or vegetable garden (coefficient alpha = 0.69 for Time 1 and
0.62 for Time 2).
Perceived incivilities I crime. In a 10-item composite, residents indicate 
whether the block has had any vacant homes/buildings, neighbors who 
do not keep up their property, a house or place where the resident sus­
pects that drug dealing occurs, burglarized houses, street robberies or 
assaults, or evidence of gang activity in the past 12 months. Residents 
also rated, on a 10-point scale, the degree to which their block had 
experienced problems with graffiti, loud neighbors, traffic, and loose 
or stray dogs and cats in the past 12 months (adapted from LaGrange, 
Ferraro, and Supancic 1992; Taylor and Hale 1986) (coefficient alpha =
0.73 for Time 1 and 0.72 for Time 2).
Homeownership and other variables. A number of social and demo­
graphic variables, including homeownership, gender, age, income, 
racial/ethnic identity, marital status, household size, religious affilia­
tion, type of housing, and years of residence, were collected.
Police reports o f crime. Following procedures used at Time 1 (Brown, 
Perkins, and Brown 2004), all final crime reports were tracked for each 
sample address after the interview was complete and until 9 months 
after the end of the Time 1 interviews or 12 months after the Time 2 
interviews (Time 3). Crime was coded into four categories: No crime 
(55.5 percent for Time 1 and 55.8 percent for Time 3), 1 occurrence 
(20.0 percent for Time 1 and 22.7 percent for Time 3), 2 to 3 occur­
rences (14.3 percent for Time 1 and 13.9 percent for Time 3), and 4 or 
more occurrences (10.2 percent for Time 1 and 7.6 percent for Time 3). 
Because the time between the environmental assessment or interview 
and the final date for the police report data varied, the reports were 
divided by the number of months after the interview to compute a
2 Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is a measure of internal consistency that varies from 0 to 
1, with higher scores indicating greater consistency.
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crime rate measure, which ranged from 0 to 0.33 crime reports per 
month. The measure was log-transformed for the multivariate 
analyses.
To test Level 2 (block-level) variables with HLM, the above composites 
were simply aggregated to block means. This is appropriate for HLM 
because the variance predicted at each level is a separate pool.
R esu lts
S tra teg y  o f  a n a lys is
The analyses proceed in four phases. First, we describe the new sub­
division residents. Second, we examine physical incivilities and other 
characteristics of the neighborhood before and after the new construc­
tion and at varying distances from it. Third, we assess distance-by-time 
interactions to see whether the new housing was related to reductions 
in nearby crime and incivilities. Fourth, we test longitudinal linkages 
between individual- and block-level incivilities and crime, using data 
where incivilities are assessed for the same address at both times.
Who moved in? The major attraction of the new subdivision was its 
affordability. As part of a separate study (Brown, Brown, and Perkins 
2004), 56 of the 84 new households were interviewed, and 96 percent 
said that affordability was a reason for moving in. Although the city 
had earmarked 20 percent of homes as affordable units, fully 55 per­
cent of the residents reported getting some form of second loan assis­
tance, and 41 percent said that the availability of such loans was one 
reason they moved in. We compared the new subdivision residents with 
those moving into the surrounding neighborhood at the same time to 
understand the type of residents the neighborhood would attract with­
out the special brownfield conversion program. New residents to the 
subdivision had higher household incomes, with 61 percent reporting 
more than $43,000 (1997) dollars, compared with only 9 percent of 
other recent arrivals. Married couples comprised 77 percent of the new 
subdivision residents, compared with only 41 percent of newcomers to 
the surrounding neighborhood. Although 60 percent of both subdivision 
residents and other newcomers were non-Hispanic whites, Asians were 
the predominant minority for the subdivision (24 percent Asians and 
13 percent Hispanics), while Hispanics were the predominant minority 
for the surrounding neighborhood (2 percent Asian and 24 percent His­
panic). Thus, the housing was all sold, and the subdivision attracted 
higher-income residents.
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Are incivilities correlated over tim e? Despite the fact that incivilities 
can involve very changeable features, incivilities do show some stability 
from 1993 to 1998, as shown in table 1. The composite (8-item) meas­
ure of incivilities is correlated over time, at both the individual prop­
erty (r = 0.43) and aggregated block levels (r = 0.61). All incivilities 
observed at the same address are correlated significantly, but modestly, 
over time (from r  = 0.12 to r  = 0.30). For data aggregated to the block 
level, five of the eight incivilities are correlated over time: litter, 
absence of a garden, peeling paint, unkempt lawns, and graffiti, with 
the latter three showing substantial correlations (from r  = 0.57 to 
r  = 0.65). Therefore, even though physical conditions have the poten­
tial to change greatly over time, some potentially quite dynamic vari­
ables (such as graffiti) showed substantial stability, while others (such 
as roof conditions) did not. Given that problems may persist for the 
same blocks, it is important to examine the consequences of incivilities.
Table 1. P h y s ic a l In c iv ilit ie s :  M eans, S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tio n s , 
an d  C o rr e la tio n s  o v e r  T im e
Simple r:












Mean of 8 items (z) 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.53 0.43*** 0.61***
Roof 0 = new; 1 = average, 2 = needs repair 1.00 0.50 0.95 0.51 0.16*** 0.13
Litter Number of pieces 1.56 2.54 0.63 1.32 0.16*** 0.28**
Peeling
paint
1 = 10%, 10 = 100% 1.34 1.86 0.85 1.57 0.24*** 0.57***
Graffiti 0 = no, 1 = yes 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.23*** 0.65***
Broken
windows
0 = no, 1 = yes 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38 0.13*** 0.15
Cracked
brick/walk
0 = no, 1 = yes 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.46 0.12*** 0.05
Poor lawn 
condition
0 = no, 1 = yes 0.27 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.30*** 0.62***
Garden 0 = no, 1 = yes 0.59 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.29*** 0.35***
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
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T im e-by-d istan ce effects
Do incivilities vaiy near the new subdivision? Data on physical dis­
tances from the new housing site were coded into six 1,000-foot incre­
ments (except for the last category, which involved distances from 5,001 
to 7,000 feet). Qualities of the six zones surrounding the new site are 
summarized for both resident and housing characteristics in tables 2 
and 3, respectively. These tables show both main effects for distance 
from the new housing (zones 1 through 6) and time (before or after the 
new housing was built), as well as interactions between distance and 
time (see the final column).
Figure 1 shows tha t incivilities were highest in the three zones closest 
to the brownfield and lowest in the three th a t were farthest away 
(based on z-score transformations). At Time 2, observed incivilities 
were still highest in the three zones closest to the new housing and 
lowest farther away, but the effect was not as strong as it was at Time
1. For example, the second row of table 2 shows th a t incivilities yielded 
a main effect for distance, tempered by a significant distance-by-time 
interaction, both of which are illustrated in figure 1. The pattern is
Figure 1. Observed Incivilities by Time by Distance from New Housing
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that incivilities are higher near the new housing site and lower farther 
away, but especially at Time 1, when the site was a brownfield with 
abandoned buildings. A similar pattern appears with homeownership. 
Levels varied from 64 percent to 93 percent at Time 1, with higher 
levels of homeownership farther from the brownfield, but later home­
ownership leveled out, hovering at about 75 percent across blocks at 
Time 2.
This pattern of interaction appears consistent across the neighborhood, 
including the specific physical incivilities listed in table 3. Whether 
years of residence, number of pieces of litter on the property, peeling 
paint, or the presence of gardens are examined, significant interactions 
generally reveal greater variability across blocks at Time 1 than at 
Time 2. Furthermore, worse conditions—more litter, more peeling 
paint, more cracked bricks or sidewalks, and fewer gardens—tend to 
occur in the three zones closest to the brownfield at Time 1.
HLM  model specification. Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) urge 
researchers to use both conceptual and empirical guidance to create 
HLM models that are as simple as possible, without omitting important 
variables. For both conceptual and empirical reasons, homeownership 
was included as a control variable in the cross-sectional analysis from 
data gathered at Time 1 (Brown, Perkins, and Brown 2004) and contin­
ued to be an important predictor at Time 2. Some researchers presume 
that resident age indexes vulnerability and is therefore important to 
control for in studies of crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Although 
not significant at Time 1, the correlations in appendix A (table A.l) 
and early HLM model-building results demonstrate that resident age 
should also be a control variable. The selection of an intact neighbor­
hood provides a control for other sources of potential variability. Addi­
tional control variables unrelated to crime include income, race 
(non-Hispanic whites versus others), marital status (married or not 
married), religious affiliation (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints or not), gender, and single-family detached housing style.3
3 When resident age and homeownership are controlled, other potential controls 
become insignificant. Although years of residence also had an r = -0.15 to crime, this 
effect reduced to r = -0.03 after controlling for homeownership. Of the two variables, 
homeownership was chosen as a control because of its higher correlation with crime. 
Household size was the only potential control variable still (positively) correlated with 
crime, after partialling resident age and homeownership (r = 0.07, p = 0.04). However, 
the subsequent HLM model was computed with and without this control variable; fol­
lowing Bryk and Raudenbush’s (1992) criteria for dropping nonsignificant variables, 
household size can be dropped from the analysis. To be cautious, analyses were also run 
with individual- and block-level race (non-Hispanic white versus other) and income as 
controls, given that they are frequently used as controls in studies of diverse neighbor­
hoods (Bursik 1988). However, block and individual race and income were insignificant
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A first step in HLM is to determine whether crime varies across blocks, 
thereby justifying the need for HLM. This test (termed a test of the 
unconditional model) shows th a t blocks differ significantly in crime, 
with 14.06 percent, a significant amount, indicated as between-block 
variance: combined Time 1 and Time 2 data, x2 (57) =  275.53, p  < 0.001.
New subdivision effects. If spillover benefits from the new subdivision 
occur, they are expected to be very geographically circumscribed (Gins­
berg 1982). Statistically, spillover benefits would constitute a significant 
time-by-distance interaction effect (computed from standardized time 
and distance scores). That is, the residents near the new subdivision 
would benefit, with extra reductions in incivilities and/or crime, over 
and above any changes occurring farther away in the surrounding 
neighborhood.
The interaction between time and distance from the new subdivision, 
when entered alone into the equation, is significant: t (approximate df\ 
945) = 2.38, p  = 0.017. Figure 2 shows tha t at Time 1, crime reports
Figure 2. Police-Reported Crime by Time by Distance from New Housing
Up to 1,001- 2,001- 3,001­
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
4,001- 5,001­
5,000 7,000
Distance in Feet from the Housing Site
when added to the model (all p  > 0.25), and deviance statistics indicated that the vari­
ables did not improve model fit: x2 (4) = 2.37, p  > 0.5. These variables are likely to 
have more explanatory power when studies sample across diverse neighborhoods 
instead of involving a single intact neighborhood.
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were highest near the brownfield and lowest farther away. For example, 
crime rates less than 1,000 feet from the brownfield were 0.074 per 
month, but those farthest away (5,001 to 7,000 feet) were 0.016. At 
Time 2, crime rates were more equal across the entire neighborhood.
In the zone closest to the new subdivision, crime rates had decreased 
to 0.057, and in the farthest zone, they had increased to 0.046 final 
reports per month. The linear decrease in crime with greater distance 
from the site was significant at Time 1 [F(l, 343) = 11.62, p  = 0.001] 
and not significant at Time 2 (F < 1).
The next model, summarized in table 4, enters appropriate demo­
graphic controls (resident age and homeownership), as well as the 
observed incivilities and home attachments that were significant at 
Time 1. Significant individual Level 1 predictors show that younger 
residents (p  = 0.001) and those who do not own their homes 
(p  = 0.006) are more susceptible to subsequent crime. Properties with 
more observed incivilities also tended to have more subsequent crime 
(p  = 0.053).4 When these other predictors are entered into the equa­
tion, the time-by-distance interaction term maintains its statistical sig­
nificance (p  = 0.026). This combination of Level 1 predictors explained
Table 4. P r e d ic t in g  C rim e: H ie ra r ch ic a l L in ea r  M odels,
C om b in ed  a cr o ss  T im e 1 to  T im e 3
Standard
Fixed Effects Coefficient Error T-ratio d f p Value
Intercept, yOO 0.021417 0.0011 19.00 54 0.001
Level 2 (street block)
Residents’ ages, y03 0.000305 0.0002 1.79 54 0.078
Home incivilities, yOl 0.017059 0.0049 3.47 54 0.001
Home attachment, y02 -0.006874 0.0038 -1.81 54 0.075
Level 1 (individuals)
Age, y30 -0.000134 0.0001 -3.38 962 0.001
Homeowner, y20 -0.004920 0.0018 -2.76 962 0.006
Home incivilities, ylO 0.003087 0.0016 1.93 962 0.053
Time x distance, y40 0.001267 0.0006 2.22 962 0.026
Standard Variance
Random Effects Deviation Component d f t p value
Intercept, U0 0.0070 0.00005 46.00 184.74 0.001
Level 1, R 0.0231 0.00053
4 Although observed incivilities were significant, resident reports of perceived incivili­
ties were not. Perceived incivilities were not significant when added to or substituted 
for observed incivilities, so they were dropped from further analyses. There was some 
block-level correlation between the two measures (r = 0.31 at Time 1 and r = 0.41 at 
Time 2), indicating that observed incivilities are more likely to be present when many 
neighbors, not just one resident, say they are present.
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a significant amount of variance over the unconditional model: x2 (4) = 
47.43, p  < 0.0001.
At the block level, higher average resident ages tended to go with more 
crime (p  = 0.078). Residents were also more likely to experience crime 
if their block had more observed incivilities (p  = 0.001) or if their 
neighbors had lower levels of attachment to the homes on the block 
(p  = 0.075). These block-level predictors explained significantly more 
variance than the Level 1 predictors alone—x2 (3) = 26.05, p  < 0.001. 
The combination of variables explains 3.64 percent of the variance 
between individuals within blocks and 44.44 percent of the variance 
between blocks.
However, these results are strongly influenced by the data collected 
at Time 1. If we reanalyze using only Time 2 data (deleting the time- 
by-distance interaction term), only individual-level resident age 
(p  = 0.001) is significant, and the explained variability decreases to 
3.02 percent and 11.32 percent at the individual and block levels, 
respectively Thus, as the neighborhood changed over time and the 
distribution of both incivilities and crimes became more diffuse 
instead of concentrated, the ability of physical incivilities and home 
attachments to predict subsequent crime decreased.
L o n g itu d in a l p re d ic t io n s  o f  cr im e  
from  o b serv ed  in c iv ilit ie s
Analysis strategy
To move to a more longitudinal focus on observed incivilities, the next 
tests incorporate a different data set structured to combine Time 1 and 
Time 2 data into one case for each address. Instead of testing just the 
incivilities composite, two promising specific, observed incivilities were 
also examined. Few studies of inner-ring incivilities have been con­
ducted, so it is useful to highlight those specific incivilities that are 
especially significant in this context.
In addition, we conduct longitudinal tests, not just on the absolute lev­
els of Time 3 crime, but on scores representing crime increases over 
earlier levels. These are residualized change scores, developed from 
removing the part of Time 3 crime that could be predicted from pre­
existing amounts of crime at Time 1, following procedures similar to 
Bursik (1986), Taylor and Covington (1993), and Taylor (2001). The 
case that incivilities cause crime is strengthened when the ones that 
are assessed relate to unexpected increases in crime.
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L o n g itu d in a l effects: In c iv ilitie s , la w n  co n d ition s , a n d  litte r  
p re d ic tin g  crim e a n d  increases in  crim e over tim e
For the incivilities composite, poor lawn conditions, and litter, we tested 
three models to answer different questions. Measures include block and 
individual scores on incivilities (1993) and crime (1995 to 1996) at Time
1, incivilities at Time 2 (1998), and crime at Time 3 (1999 to 2000). 
Results are shown in figures 3 through 5 (see also a summary of HLM 
specifications in appendix B and tests summarized in table B.l).
Model A: Do physical incivilities on a resident’s property or block (at 
Time 2) predict crime risk (at Time 3)? This question is addressed in 
the bulk of incivilities and crime research, but does not introduce more 
demanding controls for changing patterns of crime.
Model B: Do physical incivilities on a resident’s property or block (at 
Time 2 )predict increasing crime risks (from Time 1 to Time 3)? This 
tests whether incivilities are high in areas experiencing increases in 
crime, but results do not indicate whether the incivilities or the crime 
increased first.
Model C: Do early (Time 1) or increasing levels (Time 1 to 2) o f physical 
incivilities on a resident’s property or block predict increasing risk o f  
crime (from Time 1 to Time 3)? If increases in incivilities and crime go 
together, these related changes may reflect some pre-existing neighbor­
hood quality. If incivilities precede crime and increases in crime, they 
are more likely to cause it.
Incivilities and crime. As shown in figure 3, the Time 2 block-level in­
civilities composite predicts subsequent Time 3 crime rates (Model A, 
p  = 0.001). When controlling for earlier Time 1 crime levels, Time 2 
block-level incivilities predict unexpected increases in crime at that 
address (Time 1 to Time 3; Model B, p  = 0.023). Finally, more Time 1 
block incivilities predict greater unexpected increases in property-level 
crime (Time 1 to Time 3; Model C, p  = 0.078), demonstrating that high 
levels of incivilities precede the increases.5
Unkempt lawns and crime. As shown in figure 4, similar patterns of 
effects occur for the individual incivility of an unkempt lawn. Time 2 
blocks with more unkempt lawns predict more Time 3 crime (Model A, 
p  = 0.001). Unkempt lawns on Time 2 blocks (Model B, p  = 0.001)
5 All Model C tests were rerun with Time 1 crime as a control, and no changes in signif­
icance level were observed.
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Figure 3. S ig n ific a n t R e la t io n sh ip s  b e tw e e n  In c iv ilit ie s  an d  C rim e  
(M od els A  th ro u g h  C)
A. Arrows represent significant relationships between incivilities and crime, without controls for 
prior crime.
B. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 2 (1998) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1999 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995).
C. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 1 (1993) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1994 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995). Arrows represent 
significant relationships between increases in incivilities (1993 to 1998) and increases in crime 
(1994 to 2000).
predict unexpected increases in crime (Time 1 to Time 3). Longitudi­
nally, Time 1 blocks with poor lawns predict unexpected increases in 
crime (Time 1 to Time 3; Model C,p  = 0.025).
Litter and crime. As shown in figure 5, relationships between litter and 
crime were the most significant. Time 2 blocks and individual proper­
ties with more litter had more Time 3 crime (Model A, p  = 0.001 and 
p  = 0.001, respectively). Time 2 blocks with more litter also showed 
unexpected increases in crime (Time 1 to Time 3; Model B, p  = 0.068);
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Figure 4. L o n g itu d in a l R e la t io n sh ip s  b e tw e e n  U n k em p t L aw n s a n d  C rim e
A. Arrows represent significant relationships between incivilities and crime, without controls for 
prior crime.
B. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 2 (1998) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1999 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995).
C. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 1 (1993) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1994 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995). Arrows represent 
significant relationships between increases in incivilities (1993 to 1998) and increases in crime 
(1994 to 2000).
Time 2 individual properties with more litter had unexpected increases 
in crime as well (Time 1 to Time 3; p  = 0.001). Time 1 blocks with 
more litter predict unexpected increases in property-level crime (Time 
1 to Time 3; Model C,p  = 0.016). In addition, individual properties tha t 
saw unexpected increases in litter also showed unexpected increases in 
crime (p = 0.001). Once again, high levels of litter relate to crime, even 
with the more demanding test demonstrating th a t high levels of litter 
precede increases in crime.
In sum, observed incivilities are significant predictors of crime in four 
of six cases when earlier levels of crime were not controlled (Model A).
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Figure 5. Longitudinal Relationships between Litter and Crime
A. Arrows represent significant relationships between incivilities and crime, without controls for 
prior crime.
B. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 2 (1998) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1999 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995).
C. Arrows represent significant relationships between Time 1 (1993) incivilities and unexpected 
increases in crime (1994 to 2000), controlling for earlier crime (1994 to 1995). Arrows represent 
significant relationships between increases in incivilities (1993 to 1998) and increases in crime 
(1994 to 2000).
W h e n  w e in tro d u c e  co n tro ls  fo r e a r l ie r  levels o f  c rim e  (M odel B), h ig h  
levels o f  1998 in c iv ilitie s  p re d ic t m o re  u n e x p e c te d  in c re a se s  in  c rim e  
(from  T im e  1, 1995 to  1996, to  T im e  3, 1999 to  2000) fo r fo u r  o f six  
cases. T h e re  is l i t t le  ev idence  th a t  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  c r im e  u n d e rg o  s im i­
la r  d y n am ic  ch a n g es— only  in c re a se s  in  h o u se  levels o f l i t t e r  go w ith  
u n e x p e c te d  in c re a se s  in  c rim e  ( th e  on ly  o n e  o f s ix  d y n am ic  re la t io n ­
sh ip s  t h a t  is s ig n ific an t in  M odel C). B u t p re -e x is tin g  levels o f in c iv ili­
t ie s  do p re d ic t la te r  u n e x p e c te d  in c re a se s  in  c rim e. B lock  levels o f  all 
th re e  m e a s u re s  o f in c iv ilitie s  in  1993 (T im e 1) p re d ic t la te r  u n e x p e c te d  
in c re a se s  in  c rim e  fro m  T im e  2 (1995 to  1996) to  T im e  3 (1999 to  
2000); in d iv id u a l p ro p e r ty  levels o f  in c iv ilitie s  in  1993 do n o t.
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D iscussion
B o th  lo w er levels o f  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  th e  p re se n c e  o f a  n ew  h o u s in g  s u b ­
d iv is io n  n e a rb y  w e re  re la te d  to  lo w er r is k  o f c r im e  fo r re s id e n ts . T h e  
n ew  h o u s in g  w as also  r e la te d  to  few er in c iv ilitie s  o n  n e a rb y  b locks. T h e  
v a lu e  o f a t te n d in g  to  h o u s in g  co n d itio n s  o n  e x is tin g  in n e r - s u b u rb a n  
b lo ck s th re a te n e d  b y  d ec lin e  a n d  th e  v a lu e  o f in v e s tin g  in  n ew  h o u s in g  
a re  u n d e rsc o re d  in  th e s e  an a ly ses . B o th  th e s e  sm all- a n d  la rg e -sca le  
s tra te g ie s  d ese rv e  a t te n t io n  fro m  policy  m a k e rs  a s  w ays to  fo s te r  b e t te r  
co n d itio n s  a n d  lo w er c rim e  in  n e ig h b o rh o o d s .
T h e  n ew  su b d iv is io n  also  p ro v id ed  a n  a r r a y  o f b e n e fits  a s id e  fro m  an y  
sp illo v e r e ffec ts  to  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  n e ig h b o rh o o d . F ir s t,  no  re s id e n ts  
w e re  d isp laced  to  b u ild  th e s e  h o u ses . S econd, b e c a u se  ex is tin g  h o u ses  
a re  sm all a n d  n o t  o f h is to r ic  in te re s t ,  g e n tr ify in g  p re s su re s  h av e  n o t 
ta k e n  h o ld  h e re  a s  th e y  h av e  in  o th e r  p a r ts  o f th e  c ity  w ith  V ic to rian  
h o u s in g  stock . T h ird , th e  n ew  su b d iv is io n  p ro v id ed  m o re  h o u s in g  th a n  
a n tic ip a te d  to  re s id e n ts  elig ib le  fo r spec ia l lo an s, b u t  a t  th e  sa m e  tim e  
lifted  th e  av e rag e  in co m e levels o f  in -m o v ers . B ecau se  o f r is in g  p rices, 
fu lly  55 p e rc e n t  o f  n ew  h o u seh o ld s  q u a lified  fo r seco n d  lo an s, s u rp a s s ­
in g  th e  goal o f  20 p e rc e n t in itia lly  s e t  b y  th e  city. W ith o u t spec ia l p ro ­
g ra m s  to  p ro v id e  n ew  h o u sin g , i t  is  likely  t h a t  a r e a  in co m es w ou ld  
c o n tin u e  to  decline.
R e s id e n ts  o f th e  n ew  su b d iv is io n  also  re p o r te d  p lace  a t ta c h m e n ts  a s  
s tro n g  a s  th o se  o f th e  lo n g -te rm  re s id e n ts  o f  th e  s u r ro u n d in g  a r e a  a n d  
s tro n g e r  th a n  th o se  o f n ew co m ers  to  th e  s u r ro u n d in g  a r e a  (B row n, 
B ro w n , a n d  P e rk in s  2004). C o n seq u en tly , a lth o u g h  in itia lly  a t t r a c te d  
p r im a rily  b y  affo rdab ility , th e  n ew  re s id e n ts  h e lp  d iv ers ify  n e ig h b o r­
hood  in co m es a n d  a p p e a r  to  b e  sa tis f ied  w ith  th e i r  hom es. A lth o u g h  
th e s e  a re  w o rth y  b en e fits , th is  re s e a rc h  h a s  focused  o n  w h e th e r  th e  
h o u s in g  cou ld  also  c re a te  sp illo v e r b e n e fits  o f  re d u c in g  c r im e  a n d  
in c iv ilitie s  fo r th e  s u r ro u n d in g  n e ig h b o rs , m a n y  o f w h o m  d o u b te d  th a t  
a n y  re d u c tio n  in  c r im e  w o u ld  occur.
Incivilities and crime
R e su lts  s u p p o r t  h y p o th es ize d  re la tio n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  
c rim e. In c iv ilitie s  o b serv ed  a t  o n e  ad d re ss , a n d  p a r tic u la r ly  th o se  on  
b lo ck  n e ig h b o rs ’ p ro p e rtie s , in c re a se  th e  lik e lih o o d  o f u n e x p e c te d  
in c re a se s  in  p o lice -rep o rte d  c rim e  a t  t h a t  ad d ress . E v e n  m u n d a n e  
in c iv ilitie s , su c h  a s  a  p o o rly  k e p t  law n  o r litte r , p re d ic t g re a te r  v u ln e ra ­
b ility  to  c rim e. I f  a  d w e llin g  h a s  th e s e  q u a litie s , th e  re s id e n t  is  m o re  
v u ln e ra b le  to  c rim e. I f  n e ig h b o rs ’ h o m es, co llectively  o n  th e  b lock,
Housing Policy Debate
330 Barbara B. Brown, Douglas D. Perkins, and Graham Brown
h a v e  m o re  o f  th e s e  q u a litie s  t h a n  o th e r  b locks, th e  re s id e n t  is a lso  
v u ln e ra b le  to  fu tu re  crim e.
A b o u t o n e -fo u rth  o f  th e  law n s  w e re  ra te d  a s  b e in g  in  p o o r co n d itio n  a t  
b o th  T im e  1 a n d  T im e  2. H ow ever, d e sp ite  th is  k in d  o f  s tab ility , a  r e s i ­
d e n t  w h o  lived  o n  a  b lo ck  w h e re  law n s  go t u n e x p e c ted ly  w o rse  over 
t im e  w as  m o re  v u ln e ra b le  to  crim e. T h e se  e ffec ts  a r e  in  a d d itio n  to  th e  
g e n e ra l v u ln e ra b ili ty  to  su b s e q u e n t c r im e  fo u n d  fo r re s id e n ts  w h o se  
law n  o r w h o se  n e ig h b o rs ’ law n s  a re  in  p o o r co nd ition .
T h e  n u m b e r  o f  p ieces o f l i t te r  o b serv ed  in  f ro n t  o f  re s p o n d e n t h o m es 
d ec rea sed  b y  m o re  t h a n  h a l f  fro m  T im e  1 to  T im e  2 (fro m  1.56 to  0.63 
pieces). B o th  in d iv id u a l a n d  b lo ck  levels o f  l i t t e r  a t  T im e  2, b lo ck  levels 
o f  l i t te r  a t  T im e  1, a n d  u n e x p e c te d  in c re a se s  in  in d iv id u a l p ro p e r ty  l i t ­
t e r  fro m  T im e 1 to  T im e  2 p re d ic t la te r  v u ln e ra b ility  to  c rim e. In  th is  
g eo g rap h ic  a re a , law n s  do n o t th r iv e  a n d  re q u ir e  f re q u e n t  a tte n tio n . 
S im ilarly , l i t te r  is  easy  to  d ep o sit a n d  m ay  re q u ir e  v ig ilan ce  to  rem ove . 
B o th  l i t te r  a n d  law n s  ca n  b e  sen s itiv e  b a ro m e te rs  o f  re s id e n ts ’ (or 
la n d lo rd s ’) in v e s tm e n t in  p re se rv in g  n e ig h b o rh o o d  a p p e a ra n ce .
T h ese  r e s u lts  sh o w  th a t  o u r  id eas  a b o u t in c iv ilitie s  can  b e  b ro a d e n e d  
to  in c lu d e  m o re  s u b u rb a n  in d ic a to rs  t h a t  m ig h t b e  less m e a n in g fu l in  
u rb a n  se ttin g s , w h e re  law n s  a re  in f re q u e n t  a n d  sm all. T h e re , poor 
law n s  m ay  b e  less n o ticeab le ; in  s u b u rb a n  n e ig h b o rh o o d s , w h e re  law n s 
a re  n u m e ro u s  a n d  la rg e , th e y  ta k e  o n  m o re  sym bolic  fre ig h t. T h ese  
r e s u lts  a re  in  k e e p in g  w ith  re s e a rc h  o n  te r r i to r ia l  p e rso n a liz a tio n  th a t  
re v e a ls  ho w  s u b u rb a n  re s id e n ts  u s e  th e  p h y sica l e n v iro n m e n t in  a  
v a r ie ty  o f w ays t h a t  convey p o sitiv e  m essag es  a b o u t th e i r  id e n titie s  
as  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  a s  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  b lo ck  (B ro w n  1987; W erner, 
P e te rso n -L ew is , a n d  B ro w n  1989).
In  p a s t  re se a rc h , in  a  m u c h  h ig h e r- in c o m e  n e ig h b o rh o o d  in  S a lt L ak e  
City, ev en  p e rso n a liz e d  n a m e  p la te s  a n d  a d d re s s  m a rk e rs ,  w h ich  police 
ca u tio n  a g a in s t  u s in g , w e re  a sso c ia te d  w ith  less r is k  o f  b u rg la ry  (B ro w n  
a n d  A ltm a n  1983). In  r is k ie r  n e ig h b o rh o o d s , m o re  o r d iffe re n t v isu a l 
d e m a rc a tio n  o f  a  p ro p e r ty  m ay  b e  n ee d ed  to  c re a te  sym bolic  m essag es  
s tro n g  e n o u g h  to  d e te r  p ro sp e c tiv e  o ffen d e rs  (B row er, D o ck e tt, a n d  
T ay lo r 1983). E ffo rts  to  co m b a t in c iv ilitie s  a n d  c re a te  m o re  civil 
p laces  can  d ra w  o n  th e  long , r ic h  h is to ry  o f  te r r i to r ia l  p e rso n a liz a tio n  
re se a rc h . R es id e n tia l p r id e  o f  o w n e rsh ip  a n d  m a in te n a n c e  o f  te r r i to r ie s  
a re  w id esp read  a n d  can  p ro v id e  a  n e ig h b o rh o o d  re so u rc e  fo r m o b iliz in g  
e ffo rts  to  c lean  u p  in c iv ilities . A lth o u g h  th e r e  a re  c u l tu ra l  d iffe ren ces 
in  te r r i to r ia l  p e rso n a liz a tio n , g e n e ra l co n ce rn s  fo r p ro p e r ty  m a in te ­
n a n c e  m ay  p ro v id e  e n o u g h  co m m o n  g ro u n d  to  en a b le  re s id e n ts  o f  
d iv e rs ify in g  n e ig h b o rh o o d s  to  w o rk  to g e th e r  to w a rd  s h a re d  goals.
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Y ard c a re  a n d  c lean -u p  a r e  ac tio n s  t h a t  re s id e n ts  o f te n  u n d e r ta k e  sp o n ­
ta n e o u s ly  a n d  d ire c t so lely  to  th e i r  ow n p ro p e rtie s . Yet p ro g ra m s  cou ld  
b e  developed  to  e x te n d  th e s e  b en e fits  o f  p r id e  o f  p lace  to  th e  b lo ck  o r 
n e ig h b o rh o o d . S om e re s e a rc h  h a s  id en tif ied  in d ig en o u s  “p lace  m a n ­
a g e rs ,” sm a ll sh o p k e e p e rs  o r a p a r tm e n t  m a n a g e rs  w ho  a s su m e  co n tro l 
ov er p laces  a n d  th e i r  in fo rm a l policing . T h e se  in d iv id u a ls  p ro v id e  a  
v a lu a b le  serv ice , a n d  th e i r  e f fo rts  h a v e  b e e n  re in fo rce d  b y  po lice  in  
w ays t h a t  d ec rea se  p h y sica l in c iv ilitie s  a n d  in c re a se  civil b e h a v io r  
(M azero lle , K ad leck , a n d  R o eh l 1998); p e rh a p s  p lace  m a n a g e rs  c a n  b e  
c u ltiv a te d  in  m o re  s u b u rb a n  a re a s  a s  w ell. A lte rn a tiv e ly , po licies a im ed  
a t  p ro p e r ty  im p ro v e m e n ts  (code en fo rce m e n t, ev ic tions) h av e  b e e n  
lin k ed  to  s a fe r  a n d  b e t te r -m a in ta in e d  re s id e n tia l  a r e a s  (M eie r 1983). 
S u ch  po licies m ay  en a b le  re s id e n ts  co n c e rn e d  a b o u t b lo ck  a p p e a ra n c e s  
to  b e  m o re  inv o lv ed  w ith  im p ro v em en ts . I f  th e y  a re  p ro v id ed  w ith  th e  
p ro p e r  im p ro v e m e n t to o ls  a n d  policies, th e s e  re s id e n ts  m ig h t in sp ire  
b ro a d e r  n e ig h b o rh o o d  re v ita liz a tio n  effo rts .
B ecau se  m a in te n a n c e  a c tiv itie s  a re  ongo ing , th e y  m ay  p ro v id e  a n  
e n d u r in g  a n d  p o s itiv e  b a s is  fo r p ro g ra m s  to  e n c o u rag e  n e ig h b o rh o o d  
social o rg a n iz a tio n , p lace  a t ta c h m e n t,  o r  co llective efficacy (S am p so n , 
R a u d e n b u sh , a n d  E a r ls  1997). S u ch  p ro g ra m s  m ay  b e  especia lly  im p o r­
t a n t  b e c a u se  fo rm a l c r im e  p re v e n tio n  p ro g ra m s  su c h  a s  N e ig h b o rh o o d  
W atch  h av e  lim ite d  effec tiv en ess  (S h e rm a n  e t  al. 1997). N e ig h b o rh o o d  
c lean -u p s, h o m e  o r  g a rd e n  to u rs ,  co m m u n ity  g a rd en s , a n d  h o m e  re p a ir  
c lasses m ay  b e  a n  effec tive  w ay  to  e n c o u rag e  b o th  a  re d u c tio n  in  inc iv il­
itie s  a n d  a n  in c re a se  in  co m m o n  b o n d s  b e tw e e n  n e ig h b o rs . T h e  r e s u l t ­
in g  social co h esio n  o r co llec tive efficacy m ay  i ts e lf  p ro te c t  a g a in s t  fe a r  
(R oss a n d  J a n g  2000), c r im e  (S am p so n , R a u d e n b u sh , a n d  E a r ls  1997), 
a n d  d ec lin e  (T aub , Taylor, a n d  D u n h a m  1984).
New housing, incivilities, and crime
I f  th e  ab se n ce  o f in c iv ilitie s  o n  o n e ’s b lo ck  s ig n a ls  p ro te c tio n  fro m  
crim e , does th e  a d d itio n  o f a  n ew  su b d iv is io n  re d u c e  n e a rb y  inc iv ilitie s  
a n d  crim e? A lth o u g h  it  is im p o ssib le  to  ru le  o u t o th e r  re a so n s  fo r th e  
p a t te r n  ob serv ed , th e  re s u lts  a re  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  th e o ry  th a t  th e  
n ew  h o u s in g  lo w ered  b o th  c r im e  a n d  o b serv ed  in c iv ilitie s  in  n e a rb y  
b locks.
S p illo v er b e n e fits  o f  b ro w n fie ld  co n v e rs io n  to  h o u s in g  m ay  b e  ev en  
g re a te r  in  o th e r  se ttin g s . In  B o sto n , fo r exam ple , co m m erc ia l g a rb ag e  
d isp o sa l crew s h a d  d u m p ed  l i te ra lly  m o u n ta in s  o f g a rb ag e  o n  a b a n ­
d o n ed  b ro w n fie ld s  ta rg e te d  fo r h o u s in g  d ev e lo p m en t (M edoff a n d  S k la r  
1994). T h e  a b a n d o n e d  S a lt  L ak e  C ity  s ite  h a d  s c a tte re d  litte r , b ro k e n
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g lass, a n d  w eeds in  th e  p a rk in g  lo ts, b u t  w as  n o t a s  d e v a s ta te d  a s  th e  
B o sto n  s ite . N ew  c o n s tru c tio n  p ro g ra m s  th a t  p ro v id e  ev en  m o re  h o u s ­
in g  m ay  h av e  s tro n g e r  effec ts, espec ia lly  w h e n  th e y  re p la ce  la rg e r  a n d  
m o re  d e te r io ra te d  s ite s  (see E lle n  e t  al. 2001 fo r th e  e ffec ts  o f  la rg e r  
p ro jec ts  o n  p ro p e r ty  va lues).
H ow ever, th e  re s u lts  a r e  n o t co m p le te ly  po sitiv e , g iv en  th a t  b o th  c rim e  
a n d  in c iv ilitie s  ro se  in  th e  b lo ck s f a r th e s t  aw ay  fro m  th e  n ew  su b d iv i­
sio n  (a b o u t 4 ,000  to  7 ,000 fe e t aw ay). I t  is  n o t c lea r w h e th e r  th is  p a t ­
t e r n  sh o u ld  b e  t r e a te d  a s  d isp la c e m e n t o f c r im e  o r  new ly  g e n e ra te d  
crim e. I f  d a ta  co llec tion  h a d  s to p p ed  a t  3 ,000  fe e t fro m  th e  su b d iv ision , 
th e  co n c lu sio n  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  m o re  p o sitiv e— a  re d u c tio n  in  p ro b lem s 
w ith in  1 ,000 fee t o f  th e  su b d iv is io n  a n d  no  in c re a se s  b e tw e e n  1 ,000 a n d  
3 ,000  fee t away. B u t i t  is  n o t c lea r ho w  to  in te rp r e t  th e  in c re a se s  in  th e  
o u te r  r in g s  aw ay  fro m  th e  in te rv e n tio n  site . T h e  r in g s  t h a t  ex p e rien ced  
in c re a se s  in  c r im e  d id  n o t h av e  la rg e  a b a n d o n e d  s ite s  t h a t  cou ld  easily  
s u b s t i tu te  fo r th e  a b a n d o n e d  b ro w n fie ld . F u r th e r ,  a n  e x a m in a tio n  o f 
th e  d is ta n t  b lo ck s t h a t  re c o rd e d  in c re a se s  in  c r im e  show s th a t  th e y  a re  
lo ca ted  in  a  v a r ie ty  o f  d ire c tio n s  fro m  th e  n ew  h o u sin g . I t  is n o t c lea r 
h o w  c rim e  d isp la c e m e n t ca n  b e  conceived  a s  r a d ia t in g  fro m  o n e  p a r tic ­
u la r  s ite  to  a  v a r ie ty  o f  d is ta n t  s ites . In  a d d itio n , th e  m o s t d is ta n t  r in g  
ex p e rien ced  a  re d u c tio n  in  h o m eo w n e rsh ip , w h ich  g en e ra lly  p ro te c ts  
fro m  crim e . T h e re fo re , a lth o u g h  th e  d a ta  c a n n o t d isp ro v e  th e  p o ss ib il­
ity  o f d isp lace m e n t, i t  seem s less  p lau s ib le  t h a n  a l te rn a t iv e  e x p la n a ­
tio n s  (less h o m eo w n e rsh ip , h ig h e r  in c iv ilities) a n d  th e  g eo g rap h ic  
d isp e rs io n  o f  th e  in c rease .
A n o th e r  p o ss ib ility  is  t h a t  th o se  w h o  m o v ed  in to  th e  n ew  su b d iv isio n  
le ft th e  m o re  d is ta n t  r in g s , d e s ta b iliz in g  th e  edge. W e fin d  th is  u n lik e ly  
fo r sev e ra l re a so n s . F ir s t,  i t  is  d ifficu lt to  im ag in e  w h y  re s id e n ts  w ou ld  
m ove fro m  on ly  th o se  lo ca tio n s  to  th e  n ew  h o u s in g  a n d  n o t m ove from  
clo ser a re a s  a s  w ell. S econd, a  s tu d y  o f 56  o f  th e  84  n ew  h o u seh o ld s  
(see B row n , B ro w n , a n d  P e rk in s  2004) show s th a t  73 p e rc e n t h a d  b e e n  
re n te r s ,  w h e re a s  m o s t o f  o u r  sam p le  w e re  h o m eo w n ers . In  ad d itio n , 
on ly  30  p e rc e n t m oved  to  th e  n ew  su b d iv is io n  to  b e  close to  fam ily  o r 
fr ien d s , a n d  39 p e rc e n t m oved  fro m  so m ew h ere  b ey o n d  S a lt L ak e  City. 
T h e re fo re , i t  is u n lik e ly  t h a t  m a n y  n ew  re s id e n ts  re lo c a te d  fro m  th e  
m o re  d is ta n t  rin g . D ecrea sed  h o m eo w n e rsh ip  a n d  o th e r  ch a n g es  in  th e  
d is ta n t  r in g  a p p e a r  to  re flec t ca u ses  o th e r  t h a n  th e  n ew  su b d iv ision .
A n o th e r  q u e s tio n  is  w h y  th e  p h y sica l in c iv ilitie s  a n d  a t ta c h m e n ts  o f 
re s id e n ts  w e re  m o re  p o w erfu l in  p re d ic tin g  c r im e  a t  T im e  1 th a n  a t  
T im e  2. B ecau se  p h y sica l in c iv ilitie s  sh o w ed  less g eo g rap h ic  v a r ia b ility  
a t  T im e  2, th e  ab ility  to  p re d ic t c r im e  m ay  h av e  d ec rea sed  a s  th e  n e ig h ­
b o rh o o d  b ec am e  m o re  h o m o g en eo u s  w ith  re sp e c t to  inciv ilities .
Fannie Mae Foundation
Crime, New Housing, and Incivilities in a First-Ring Suburb 333
A n o th e r  possib ility , a lw ays p re s e n t  in  field  s tu d ie s , is t h a t  inc iv ilitie s  
a n d  a t ta c h m e n t  r e p re s e n t  som e th i r d  u n m e a s u re d  v a ria b le , b u t  to  
ex p la in  th e i r  d im in ish in g  im p o rta n c e , t h a t  th i r d  v a r ia b le  w o u ld  n ee d  to  
ch a n g e  i ts  re la tio n s h ip s  w ith  in c iv ilitie s  o v er tim e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , p e r ­
h a p s  th e  d ec lin e  o f  in c iv ilitie s  o v er t im e  m ig h t a c c o u n t fo r th e i r  d im in ­
ish ed  im p o rtan ce . G iv en  a  h ig h e r  level o f  in c iv ilitie s  a t  T im e  1 th a n  a t  
T im e  2, p e rh a p s  th e y  w e re  above som e th re s h o ld  t h a t  e n h a n c e d  th e ir  
ab ility  to  p re d ic t crim e.
S im ilarly , p lace  a t ta c h m e n t,  a s  a  re s id e n tia l  s tr e n g th ,  m ay  b e  m o re  
im p o r ta n t  u n d e r  w o rse  p h y sica l co n d itio n s  in  p ro te c tin g  a g a in s t  crim e. 
W ilson  a n d  K e llin g  (1982) su g g es ted  th a t  in c iv ilitie s  w o u ld  b e s t  p re d ic t 
c r im e  in  d ec lin in g  n e ig h b o rh o o d s . S tu d ie s  in d eed  d e m o n s tra te  a  
s tro n g e r  im p ac t o f  in c iv ilitie s  on  fe a r  in  m o d e ra te ly  s ta b le  n e ig h b o r­
h o ods (Taylor, S h u m a k e r, a n d  G o ttfre d so n  1985) a n d  lo w er im p a c ts  in  
n e ig h b o rh o o d s  w ith  h ig h  levels o f  in c iv ilitie s  (T ay lo r a n d  S h u m a k e r  
1990). T h u s , re s e a rc h e rs  m ay  w a n t  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  a  c e r ta in  
level o f  in c iv ilitie s  h a s  a n  effec t on  th e  lin k  b e tw e e n  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  
c r im e  o r  th e  o p e ra tio n  o f p ro te c tiv e  fa c to rs  (su ch  a s  p lace  a t ta c h m e n t  
o r co llec tive efficacy).
O u r  r e s u lts  c o n s t i tu te  u se fu l ex te n s io n s  o f  p a s t  re s e a rc h  o n  inc iv ilitie s  
b ec au se  th e y  invo lve  a  d iffe re n t se ttin g . S a lt L a k e  C ity  is n o t  a  la rge , 
o ld  city  in  th e  E a s t  o r  M id w est; m u c h  o f  th e  h o u s in g  in  th e  ta rg e t  
n e ig h b o rh o o d  w as  c o n s tru c te d  a f te r  W orld  W ar II. T h u s , o u r  re s e a rc h  
e s ta b lish e s  t h a t  f irs t- r in g  s u b u rb s  m ay  h av e  u n iq u e  p ro b lem s a n d  p o s­
s ib ilitie s  fo r lin k s  a m o n g  in c iv ilities , h o u sin g , a n d  c r im e  o r  c rim e 
p re v e n tio n . T h e  a r e a  is a lso  d iffe re n t fro m  a  social s ta n d p o in t:  M an y  
o th e r  s tu d ie s  invo lve n e ig h b o rh o o d s  w ith  a  la rg e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f b lack  
re s id e n ts . H e re , th e y  c o n s t i tu te  less th a n  2 p e rc e n t  o f  th e  s ta te  a n d  
th e  sam p le— th e re fo re , a  sm all p e rc e n ta g e  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n . B lack  
n e ig h b o rh o o d s  m ay  h av e  a  u n iq u e  h e r ita g e  a r is in g  fro m  d ecad es o f 
e x tre m e  s t ru c tu ra l  in eq u ality , seg reg a tio n , a n d  d isc r im in a tio n  (M assey  
a n d  D e n to n  1993). (H isp an ic s  a n d  A sian  A m eric an s  a re  th e  p re v a le n t 
e th n ic  m in o r itie s  in  th e  n e ig h b o rh o o d .)
F inally , co m p ared  w ith  s tu d ie s  in  C hicago  t h a t  fo u n d  less o f  a  ro le  fo r 
in c iv ilitie s  (S am p so n  a n d  R a u d e n b u s h  1999), o u r  s tu d y  m e a s u re d  in c i­
v ilitie s  on  p r iv a te  p ro p erty , w h e re  e n v iro n m e n ta l  psycho logy  su g g es ts  
t h a t  th e i r  sym bolic  e ffec ts  a r e  espec ia lly  p o te n t. F inally , m o s t s tu d ie s  o f 
in c iv ilitie s  ex a m in e  n e ig h b o rh o o d - o r b lock-level v u ln e ra b ili ty  to  crim e. 
E n v iro n m e n ta l  c rim ino logy  a n d  o u r  r e s u lts  lin k  in c iv ilitie s  to  c rim e  a t  
th e  in d iv id u a l p ro p e r ty  level a n d  to  v u ln e ra b ili ty  a s  w ell. A d d itio n a l 
s tu d ie s  o f  a  v a r ie ty  o f  d ec lin in g  s u b u rb s  a re  n e e d e d  to  e s ta b lish  th e  
g e n e ra lity  o f  lin k s  w e o b se rv ed  b e tw e e n  in c iv ilitie s  a n d  c r im e  in  th is  
n e ig h b o rh o o d .
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To th e  e x te n t  t h a t  inc iv ilitie s  in  s u b u rb a n  n e ig h b o rh o o d s  a re  a  p ro b ­
lem , i t  w ill likely  w o rse n  over tim e . A cco rd in g  to  a  re c e n t  poll, m o s t 
u rb a n  a n d  d es ig n  p ro fess io n a ls  b e liev e  t h a t  th e  d ec lin e  o f th e  f irs t-r in g , 
p o s t-W o rld  W ar II  s u b u rb s  w ill b eco m e a  m a jo r p ro b lem  in  u rb a n  a re a s  
in  th e  2 1 s t c e n tu ry  (F ish m a n  2000). P o s t-W o rld  W ar II  h o u ses  w e re  
o fte n  v e ry  sm all, to o  sm a ll to  a t t r a c t  to d a y ’s h o m e  b u y e rs . T h e y  w ere  
also  c o n s tru c te d  o f  m a te r ia ls  t h a t  w ill re q u ir e  m u c h  u p g ra d in g  a t  th is  
p o in t in  th e i r  u sa b le  life sp an . S im ilarly , p ro b lem s su c h  a s  c rim e , w h ich  
u se d  to  b e  se e n  a s  a n  exc lusive ly  c e n tra l-c ity  p h en o m en o n , a r e  b e in g  
ex p o r te d  to  th e  s u b u rb s  (B a ld assa re  1992). C o n seq u en tly , b o th  th e  
p laces  a n d  th e  p eop le  o f a g in g  s u b u rb a n  a re a s  d e se rv e  g re a te r  re s e a rc h  
a t te n t io n .
A n o th e r  fe a tu re  t h a t  d is tin g u ish e s  o u r  s tu d y  fro m  m a n y  o th e rs  is th e  
ta rg e t in g  o f  one n e ig h b o rh o o d . P e rh a p s  th e  e a s ie s t w ay  fo r a  re s e a rc h e r  
to  d e m o n s tra te  th e  effec ts  o f in c iv ilitie s  is to  sam p le  w idely  a n d  to  
in c lu d e  b o th  w e a lth ie r  a n d  p o o re r n e ig h b o rh o o d s . R e su lts  w ill g e n e r ­
a lly  show  m o re  decay, inc iv ilities , a n d  c r im e  in  th e  p o o re r p a r ts  o f  tow n . 
H ow ever, th e  policy im p lica tio n s  o f su c h  fin d in g s  a r e  n o t p o litica lly  fe a ­
sib le— calls to  re d is t r ib u te  w e a lth  o r com pel w e a lth ie r  n e ig h b o rh o o d s  to  
accep t th e i r  fa ir  s h a re  o f a ffo rd ab le  h o u s in g  w ill likely  h av e  a  lim ited  
im p ac t. H ow ever, w h e n  i t  c a n  b e  d e m o n s tra te d  t h a t  inc iv ilitie s  m a k e  a  
d iffe ren ce  b lock-by-b lock  in  d em o g rap h ica lly  s im ila r  n e ig h b o rh o o d s , 
th e n  in te rv e n tio n  p o ss ib ilitie s  m ay  b e  m o re  m an ag eab le . T h e se  re s u lts  
co n firm  T a y lo r’s (1997b) a rg u m e n ts  t h a t  b locks a r e  im p o r ta n t  in te r ­
v e n tio n  u n i ts  fo r re v ita liz a tio n  b ec au se  im p ro v e m e n t o r d ec lin e  can  
h a p p e n  b lock-by-block. In d eed , b lo ck  effec ts w e re  co n s is te n tly  m o re  
p o w erfu l t h a n  in d iv id u a l effects. In te rv e n tio n s  m ay  n ee d  to  a d d re s s  
m acro -lev e l n e ig h b o rh o o d  th r e a ts ,  su c h  a s  d e in d u s tr ia liz a tio n  o r 
d is in v e s tm e n t, a n d  m o re  m icro -level b lo ck  a n d  p ro p e r ty  th r e a ts ,  su ch  
a s  in c iv ilities , to  b e  effective.
S im p le  re c o g n itio n  o f v a r ia b ility  w ith in  n e ig h b o rh o o d s  m ay  e n a b le  
h o u s in g  officials, police, a n d  o th e rs  to  cap ita liz e  o n  o p p o r tu n itie s  to  
ta rg e t  in te rv e n tio n s  a t  b locks. A lth o u g h  som e c itie s  h av e  d e s ig n a te d  
“m u n ic ip a l b e a t  o ffice rs” (K en n ed y  1996) o r “b e a t  h e a lth  o ffice rs” 
(M azero lle , K ad leck , a n d  R o eh l 1998) to  d ea l w ith  a b a n d o n e d  h o u ses  
o r o th e r  in c iv ilities , w e b e liev e  t h a t  o th e r  o rg a n iz a tio n s  b ey o n d  th e  
police m ay  b e  effec tive  a s  w ell. F o r ex am p le , c o m m u n ity  d ev e lo p m en t 
co rp o ra tio n s  h av e  h a d  le n g th y  ex p e rien ce  w ith  im p ro v in g  n e ig h b o rh o o d  
p h y sica l co n d itio n s  a n d  m ay  h av e  good re la tio n s h ip s  w ith  local re s i­
d e n ts . T h e  ch a lle n g e  m ay  lie in  f in d in g  a n y  o rg a n iz a tio n  th a t  c a n  cross 
old  serv ice  a n d  p ro fe ss io n a l b o u n d a r ie s  to  p ro v id e  co m p re h en siv e  
n e ig h b o rh o o d  im p ro v e m e n ts  w ith  re sp e c t to  crim e , h o u s in g  co n d itio n s , 
a n d  o th e r  p ro b lem s (S ch o rr  1997).
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O u r  s tu d y  o f  s u b u rb a n  in c iv ilitie s  show s th a t  th e  a c tu a l  fe a tu re s  in  th e  
p h y sica l e n v iro n m e n t, n o t  j u s t  r e s id e n ts ’ p e rc e p tio n s  o f  th o se  fe a tu re s , 
a r e  im p o r ta n t  p re d ic to rs  o f c rim e. A lth o u g h  no  field  s tu d y  ca n  ru le  
o u t a ll th r e a t s  to  valid ity , o u r  s tu d y  fo u n d  th a t  p h y sica l in c iv ilities , 
o b serv ed  b y  t r a in e d  r a te r s  a n d  co n tro llin g  fo r e a r lie r  levels  o f  crim e , 
p re d ic t l a te r  p o lice -rep o rte d  c r im e  ra te s . T h e se  r e s u lts  w e re  o b ta in e d  
d e sp ite  a  sev en -y ea r lag  b e tw e e n  th e  f irs t  a s se ssm e n ts  o f in c iv ilitie s  a n d  
th e  la te r  a s se ssm e n ts  o f c rim e. S im ilarly , a f te r  a  n ew  su b d iv is io n  w as 
b u ilt ,  s u r ro u n d in g  b lo ck s ex p e rien ce d  a  d ec lin e  in  n e a rb y  c r im e  a n d  
inciv ilities . T h u s , in c iv ilitie s  a n d  im p ro v e m e n ts  a re  re a l  in  b o th  
p h y sica l fo rm  a n d  co n seq u en ces  a n d  su g g es t t h a t  fu tu re  h o u s in g  
po licies sh o u ld  ex am in e  co n seq u en ces  fo r c rim e.
Appendix A
Table A l .  S im p le  and P a rtia l C o rre la tio n s : L eve l 1 C om bined 
(T im e  1 and T im e  2) D a ta  Set
Variable N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1
1. Crime 967 1.00
2. Observed
incivilities
941 0.19** 1.00 0.05 -0.28** “ 0.03 0.14***
3. Distance by 967 0.07** 0.06** 1.00 0.02 -0 .01 0.07**
time
4. Attachment 966 -0.12** -0.33** 0.01 1.00 -0.16** * -0.07**
5. Perceived
incivilities
967 0.02 0.05 -0 .01 -0.18** “ 1.00 0.00
6. Homeowner 957 -0.18** -0 .20 -0 .05 0.27** “ -0.06* 1.00
7. Age 955 -0.15** -0 .22 0.02 0.19** “ -0.09** * 0.28*** 1.00
8. Income (z) 846 0.00 -0 .13 0.03 0.06 0.06* 0.19***-0.15** * 0.01
9. Household size 962 0.12** 0.13 -0 .01 -0 .01 -0.09** * -0.09** * -0.48** * 0.07**




940 -0.08** -0 .11 -0 .03 -0.10** “ 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.34*** -0 .03
12. Latter-Day 937 -0.10** -0.07** -0 .02 0.05 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.32*** -0 .04
Saints religion
13. Married 937 -0.07** -0.07** 0.03 0.11** “ -0 .03 0.09*** -0 .04 -0 .06
14. Female 940 0.00 -0 .01 -0 .05 0.05 0.03 -0 .00 -0 .01 0.00
15. Single-family 963 -0 .04 -0 .11 <* 0.02 0.13** “ -0.07** 0.40*** 0.06** 0.03
detached house
Notes: Simple rs are below the diagonal; partial rs (resident age and homeowner controlled) are 
above the diagonal and in the final column. The numbers in the column headings correspond to the 
variables enumerated in the first column.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
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Appendix B
H L M  is ch o sen  p r im a rily  fo r i ts  a b ility  to  an a ly z e  n e s te d  d a ta  co rrec tly  
a n d  to  p a r t i t io n  v a r ia n c e  in to  in d iv id u a l v e rsu s  b lo ck  levels; see 
P e rk in s  a n d  T ay lo r (1996) fo r a  d e ta ile d  review . T h e  reco m m en d ed  
s te p s  in c lu d e  te s t in g  to  e n s u re  t h a t  H L M  an a ly se s  a re  n ee d ed  a n d  th a t  
all im p o r ta n t  v a r ia b le s  a re  re ta in e d  b u t  t h a t  su p e rflu o u s  o n es  a re  
d e le te d  (B ry k  a n d  R a u d e n b u s h  1992). L evel 1 m o d el b u ild in g  occu rs  
f irs t; a  s e p a ra te  e q u a tio n  is c o m p u ted  fo r L evel 2 p re d ic to rs  o f  c r im e  
re p o rts .
G iv en  th e  p o w er lim ita tio n s  in h e re n t  in  58 b locks, a s  w ell a s  p a s t  p ra c ­
tic e s  (P e rk in s  a n d  T ay lo r 1996) a n d  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  to  in c re a se  p ro b ­
ab ility  levels fo r m o re  re lia b le  g ro u p  d a ta  (K en n y  a n d  la  Voie 1985), 
L evel 2 w ill b e  a d ju s te d  to  0.10. B ecau se  o f th e  low  levels o f  m iss in g  
d a ta ,  e q u a tio n s  u se  fu ll m ax im u m  lik e lih o o d  e s tim a tio n  p ro c e d u re s  a n d  
p a irw ise  e lim in a tio n  o f  m iss in g  v a riab le s . L evel 1 d a ta  a re  c e n te re d  for 
th e  b lock , a n d  L evel 2 d a ta  a re  c e n te re d  fo r th e  e n t i re  sam p le . All 
an a ly se s  w e re  co n d u c te d  u s in g  H L M  5.01 (R a u d e n b u sh  e t  al. 2000).
B ecau se  th e  lo n g itu d in a l an a ly se s  focus o n  o b serv ed  in c iv ilitie s  b u t  
exc lude  psycho log ica l v a r ia b le s  o b ta in e d  fro m  re s id e n t  in te rv iew s, th e  
d a ta  fo r a n a ly se s  su m m a riz e d  in  ta b le  B. 1 in c lu d e  c r im e s  o c c u rrin g  
a f te r  in c iv ilitie s  w e re  assessed . T h u s  c r im e s  o c c u rr in g  a f te r  th e  collec­
t io n  o f in c iv ilitie s  d a ta  b u t  b e fo re  th e  in te rv ie w s  a re  in c lu d ed  to  p ro v id e  
th e  m o s t se n s itiv e  p o ssib le  m e a su re s  o f  la te r  crim es.
In  ta b le  B .l ,  u n e x p e c te d  c h a n g es  a re  a sse sse d  b y  sav in g  th e  s ta n d a rd ­
ized  re s id u a ls  fro m  u s in g  T im e  1 v a r ia b le s  to  p re d ic t th e  sam e  v a r ia b le  
in  T im e  2 (fo llow ing  a  lin e  o f in c iv ilitie s  re s e a rc h  rev iew ed  b y  T ay lo r 
1999a, 2001). A ll e q u a tio n s  in  ta b le  B .l  co n tro l fo r T im e  2 in d iv id u a l 
h o m eo w n e rsh ip , age, in te rv ie w  m o d e  ( te le p h o n e  v e rsu s  face-to -face 
in te rv iew s) , a n d  in te rv a l  b e tw e e n  T im e  1 a n d  T im e  2 a s se ssm e n ts  
o f in c iv ilities . M odels A  a n d  B also  co n tro l fo r T im e  2, b lock-level h o m e ­
o w n e rsh ip , a n d  age; M odel C co n tro ls  fo r T im e  1 b lock-level h o m e ­
o w n e rsh ip , re s id e n t  age, a n d  th e  ch a n g e  in  o w n e rsh ip  fro m  T im e  1 to  
T im e  2.
In  a d d itio n , w e te s te d  a l te rn a t iv e  t r e a tm e n ts  o f th e  c r im e  o u tco m e  v a r i­
ab le . A s re co m m en d ed  b y  S n id je rs  a n d  B o sk e r (1999), a  s q u a re  ro o t 
t r a n s fo rm a tio n  o f  c r im e  c o u n ts  co llapsed  in to  five ca te g o rie s  o f  c rim es  
(0 to  5 o r m o re) y ie ld ed  v e ry  s im ila r  re s u lts .  A  n o n lin e a r  P o isso n  a n a ly ­
sis  o f  th e  T im e  2 c r im e  c o u n ts  (ra n g in g  fro m  0 to  11 c r im e s  a n d  co n ­
tro ll in g  fo r T im e  1 c rim e) sh o w ed  som e d iffe ren ces  ( th re e  v a r ia b le s
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Table B.l. P re d ic tin g  P o lice  R eports  w ith  T im e 1, T im e  2, 
and U nexpected  C hange (A) in  S e lected In c iv ilit ie s  
fro m  T im e  1 to  T im e  2 (H LM  R esu lts)
Final Police Reports
Crime Level (L) and Time of ------------------------------
Predictors Outcome Model Incivility Predictors Coefficient p  Value
Incivilities Time 3 1A L I (house), Time 2 0.003098 0.080
(8 items) L2 (block), Time 2 0.010789 0.001***
Time 1-3 IB L I (house), Time 2 0.036093 0.453
change L2 (block), Time 2 0.369162 0.023**
Time 1-3 1C L I (house) incivilities, Time 1 0.019896 0.796
change L I (house) incivilities A, Time 1-2 0.011194 0.686
L2 (block) incivilities, Time 1 0.215450 0.078*
L2 (block) incivilities A, Time 1-2 0.041298 0.589
Bad lawn Time 3 3A L I (house), Time 2 0.002910 0.116
condition L2 (block), Time 2 0.018094 0.001***
Time 1-3 3B L I (house), Time 2 0.100742 0.083
change L2 (block), Time 2 0.768016 0.001***
Time 1-3 3C L I (house) lawn, Time 1 0.052752 0.438
change L I (house) lawn A, Time 1-2 0.041866 0.152
L2 (block) lawn, Time 1 0.590328 0.025**
L2 (block) lawn A, Time 1-2 0.118897 0.211
Litter Time 3 2A L I (house), Time 2 0.003642 0.000***
L2 (block), Time 2 0.006250 0.000***
Time 1-3 2B L I (house), Time 2 0.072634 0.001***
L2 (block), Time 2 0.169258 0.068*
Time 1-3 2C L I (house) litter, Time 1 -0.013342 0.413
change L I (house) litter A, Time 1-2 0.094210 0.001***
L2 (block) litter, Time 1 0.072277 0.016**
L2 (block) litter A, Time 1-2 0.114818 0.112
Note: All models control for Time 2 individual homeownership, age, interview mode (phone or in 
person), and time interval between Time 1 and Time 2 assessments of incivilities. Models A and B 
also control for Time 2, block-level homeownership, and age; C model also controls for Time 1 
block-level homeownership and resident age and the change in ownership from Time 1 to Time 2. 
Final reports were collected after house conditions were rated.
*p < 0.10 for block-level predictors. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
b ecam e  less s ig n ific an t a n d  th re e  b ec am e  m o re  s ig n ifican t; a  su m m a ry  
ta b le  is av a ilab le  fro m  th e  f irs t  a u th o r  o n  re q u e s t) .
W e co n d u c te d  ad d itio n a l te s ts  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  p lace  a t ta c h m e n ts  
o n  th e  b lo ck  a t  T im e  1 cou ld  re d u c e  th e  im p a c t o f  inc iv ilitie s  o n  la te r  
ch a n g es  in  c rim e  (in  M odel C), b u t  i t  w as n o t  a  ro b u s t  factor. R e su lts  
fo r law n  a n d  l i t te r  w e re  u n c h a n g e d , a l th o u g h  th e  sig n ifican ce  o f  th e  
in c iv ilitie s  co m p o site  d id  d ec lin e  ( f ro m p  =  0 .078  t o p  =  0 .175). S im i­
larly, a  co m p o site  m e a s u re  o f  social t ie s  o n  th e  b lo ck  d id  n o t  a c co u n t fo r 
th e  ch an g e . W e also  te s te d  ch a n g in g  in co m e a n d  y e a rs  o f  re s id en ce , b u t  
th e y  d id  n o t  re a lly  re d u c e  th e  e ffec ts  o f  in c iv ilitie s  o n  la te r  ch a n g es  in  
c r im e  (a lth o u g h  a g a in  th e  s ign ificance o f  th e  in c iv ilitie s  co m p o site  d id
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d ec lin e  f r o m p  =  0 .078  t o p  =  0 .204). R e su lts  a r e  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  
id e a  t h a t  p a r tic u la r  in c iv ilitie s  in  th is  c o n te x t m ay  h av e  a  d ire c t effec t 
o n  o ffen d e r d ec isio n s to  co m m it c rim es, a l th o u g h  a n  u n m e a s u re d  social 
v a r ia b le  m a y  ac co u n t fo r th e  e ffec ts  a s  w ell.
E x p la in e d  va r ia n ce . M odel A, w ith  a n  o u tco m e  o f th e  lo g -tran sfo rm ed  
police re p o r t  r a te  in  th e  m o n th s  a f te r  th e  a s s e ss m e n t o f in c iv ilitie s  
(N  =  875), sh o w ed  th a t  3 .12  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  w as b e tw e e n  
b locks. T h e  e q u a tio n s  te s t in g  th e  in c iv ilitie s  co m p o site  a n d  th e  s ing le  
in c iv ilitie s  o f p o o r law n  a n d  l i t t e r  ac co u n ted  fo r all o f th e  b e tw een - 
b lo ck  v a r ia n c e  a n d  m o d e s t a m o u n ts  o f w ith in -b lo ck  v a r ia b ility  (1 .56 
p e rc e n t, 1.56 p e rc e n t, a n d  3 .17 p e rc e n t  fo r w ith in -b lo ck  v a r ia b ility  
p re d ic te d  by  th e  in c iv ilitie s  com posite , law n s, a n d  litte r , re sp ec tiv e ly ). 
F o r M odels B a n d  C, re s id u a liz e d  c h a n g e  sco res  in d ic a te  u n ex p e c te d  
c h a n g es  in  c r im e  fro m  T im e  1 to  T im e  3 (N  =  463); 17.12 p e rc e n t  of 
th e  v a r ia b ility  in  ch a n g e  sco res w as d u e  to  d iffe ren ces b e tw e e n  b locks. 
M odel B, u s in g  T im e  2 d a ta  to  p re d ic t  u n e x p e c te d  c h a n g es  in  c rim e  
(T im e 1 to  T im e  3), re v e a ls  t h a t  m o d e s t w ith in -b lo ck  v a r ia b ility  w as 
e x p la in ed  (0 .86 p e rc e n t, 1.16 p e rc e n t, a n d  2 .53 p e rc e n t, respectively , fo r 
com posite , law n s, a n d  l i t te r ) . A lso, g re a te r  p ro p o r tio n s  o f b e tw een - 
b lo ck  v a r ia n c e  w e re  ex p la in e d  (1 .48 p e rc e n t, 10.85 p e rc e n t, a n d  21 .78  
p e rc e n t, respectively , fo r  com posite , law n s, a n d  litte r ) .
In  M odel C, w h ich  te s te d  T im e  1 in c iv ilitie s  a n d  ch a n g es  in  T im e  1 to  
T im e  2 in c iv ilitie s  to  p re d ic t u n e x p e c te d  c h a n g es  in  crim e , 17.12 p e r ­
ce n t o f th e  v a r ia b ility  a g a in  o cc u rre d  b e tw e e n  blocks. M o d est a m o u n ts  
o f w ith in -b lo ck  v a r ia b ility  a re  ex p la in ed  (1.11 p e rc e n t, 1.44 p e rc e n t, 
a n d  2 .99  p e rc e n t, respectively , fo r co m p o site , law n s, a n d  l i t te r ) ,  w h ile  
m o re  s u b s ta n t ia l  a m o u n ts  o f b e tw een -b lo ck  v a r ia b ility  a re  ex p la in ed  
(39.47 p e rc e n t, 51 .22  p e rc e n t, a n d  47 .40  p e rc e n t, respectively , fo r com ­
p o site , law n s , a n d  l i tte r ) .  F o r all th r e e  m odels, th e  re m a in in g  re s id u a l 
v a r ia n c e  is s till  s ig n ifican t, su g g e s tin g  th a t  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  a re  n eed ed .
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